报告题目： Government Venture Capital: Crowding-in or Crowding-out?
主讲嘉宾： Vincenzo Quadrini（美国南加州大学Marshall商学院教授）
时 间：6月4日（周四）上午10:00-12:00
地 点：西安交通大学创新港涵英楼8001会议室
报告人简介：
Vincenzo Quadrini是一位专注于国际经济学、企业家精神以及金融契约的宏观经济学家。他的研究成果曾发表在《美国经济评论》（American Economic Review）、《政治经济学杂志》（Journal of Political Economy）、《经济研究评论》（Review of Economic Studies）及其他学术期刊上。他曾担任《经济动态评论》（Review of Economic Dynamics）的协调编辑，同时也是经济政策研究中心（CEPR）的研究员。在加入南加州大学（USC）之前，Vincenzo Quadrini教授曾在纽约大学、杜克大学和庞培法布拉大学担任教职。
摘要：
We study how government venture capital (GVC) investment affects the financial and investment decisions of funded firms using firm-level data from a large commercial bank in China. We find that GVC funding is associated with higher bank borrowing and real investment for funded firms (crowding in rather than crowding out). We do not find the same results for private venture capital (PVC) investment. Another finding is that GVC investments spill over to firms that do not receive venture capital investment but are connected to the funded firms through their supply chain network.
