报告题目：Rosca Meets Fiancial Market

报告人：柯荣住教授

时间：2021年1月29日上午10:00-12:00

腾讯会议号：842 306 730

报告人简介：

柯荣住教授，出生浙江温州，1998年毕业于浙江大学，获经济学学士学位；2001年获浙江大学经济学硕士学位；2001-2004年在北京大学工商管理研究所从事专职研究；2004-2009年赴世界著名学府麻省理工学院经济系深造并获经济学博士学位；师从著名经济学家、诺贝尔奖获得者本特-霍姆斯特朗教授。2009-2019年任教于香港中文大学、香港浸会大学等。2020年开始被特聘为浙江大学“文科领军”教授、博士生导师。

目前已在Journal of Labor Economics, Operations Research, Theoretical Economics，Management Science等国际权威经济管理专业杂志上等发表文章。也曾在本科及硕士求学期间在《中国社会科学季刊》(香港)、《中国社会科学评论》(香港)、《中国经济学季刊》、《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》、《经济学季刊》等权威杂志上发表20多篇文章。曾参与国家自然科学基金项目、杰出青年科学基金项目，教育部重点课题，浙江省社会科学重大课题；国家体改办体改研究会等研究项目多项；独立主持或参与香港政府研究局等资助的课题若干项。曾获浙江大学最高奖学金“竺可桢奖”，研究成果曾获浙江省社会科学优秀成果奖。目前主要研究领域包括微观经济学，现代企业理论，合同理论与组织经济学等。

讲座摘要：

Rotating Savings and Credit Association (Rosca) is an important informal financial institution in many parts of the world used by participants to share income risks. What is the role of Rosca when formal credit market is introduced? We develop a model in which risk-averse participants attempt to hedge against their private income shocks with access to both Rosca and a formal credit market and investigate their interactions. Using the gap of the borrowing and saving interest rates as a measure of the imperfectness of the credit market, we compare three cases: (i) Rosca without credit market; (ii) Rosca with a perfect credit market; (iii) Rosca with an imperfect credit market. We show that a perfect credit market completely crowds out the role of Rosca. However, when credit market is present but imperfect, we show that Rosca and the formal credit market can complement each other in improving social welfare. Interestingly, we find that the social welfare in an environment with both Rosca and formal credit market does not necessarily increase monotonically as the imperfectness of the credit market converges to zero.

经济与金融学院

2021年1月22日