报告题目： Bribery, Legal Environment, and M&As in China

（中文题目：腐败、法制环境与中国企业并购）

报 告 人：洪祥骏博士

时   间：2019年10月24日上午10点

地   点：西安交大财经校区教学楼8楼国际交流厅

报告人简介：

洪祥骏，男，福建厦门人，1993年4月生。2015年本科毕业于浙江大学经济学院，2015年至今为清华大学经济管理学院金融学博士生（应届毕业生），2017年达特茅斯学院塔克商学院访问学者，主要研究方向为公司并购，资产证券化，自然语言处理，金融科技。曾在北大核心期刊和SSCI期刊发表数篇论文。在博士研究生期间荣获国家奖学金、综合一等奖学金、清华创意课题一等奖，本科期间荣获浙江省优秀毕业生、百优毕业论文、挑战杯省赛特等奖等。

摘  要：

Regulation of government on M&A can induce the distortion of bribery, with detrimental impact on efficiency of M&A in emerging market. We study how legal environment and corporate bribery expenditure jointly shape merger activities and outcomes in China following decentralization of authority from central to local government and anti-corruption campaign. We find the bribery’s signal role in reducing information asymmetry between high efficient firms and government since firms with higher entertainment and travel costs (ETC) are more likely to obtain approval for cross-border and domestic mergers before the deregulation. The efficient firms in disadvantage of policy and location can overcome institutional inefficiency in virtue of bribery. The inefficient firm with political connection firms also rely on bribery to obtain resource. Deregulations and anti-corruption campaign weakened the influence of ETC expenditure on merger activities in the subsequent year, particularly for firms with political ties since political ties are accompanied with political pressure to help government fulfill the social objective and may reduce firm’s profitability such as salvaging inefficient state-owns or alleviate regional poverty. In implication, deregulation can promote the chance of mergers approval allocated more to efficient firms without bribery and inhibit the political pressure imposed to the firms with M&As.

经金学院

2019年10月12日